Introducing a Philosophy of Comparisons
There have been very few (if any) attempts made to provide a complete, comprehensive account of comparisons within philosophy; which is rather suprising given how commonly the subject appears in ordinary conversation. And by ‘comparisons’ I mean evaluative statements between two things - “This is better than that”. These are statements we make all the time, and yet they often lead to disagreements and confusion because of their logical nuances; which I will begin to discuss in this article.
I should note that I intend to use this Substack as a rough sketch of my ideas to be shared, hopefully inviting discussion and criticism that will help me to develop my thoughts. So please, do comment any thoughts you have on these articles, and I will respond them!
There is a clear logical difference between what I will call opinions of fact1 and preferences of taste - and yet both are often phrased interchangeably in ordinary conversation. For example, one might say “I think potatoes are more nutritious than carrots”. Such a claim is an opinion of fact, and is open to objection from anyone who might have reason to disagree. By contrast, one might say “I think strawberry is tastier than vanilla”, and the matter would not be up for debate. We could attempt to combat such a statement with argumentation - “Strawberry is sweeter and clearly tastier,” - but such disputes would rightly be dismissed; “This is just my preference of taste.” - and there is no disputing about tastes (de gustibus non est disputandum…). This is because the truth of such statements are determined solely by the taste of the individual stating them.
It can sometimes be unclear which of these kinds of statement we intend when making comparisons. For example, “I think Federer is a better tennis player than Nadal” could declare either a preference of taste or an opinion of fact - and an interlocutor could only know through enquiring further:
“Do you mean Federer is objectively better than Nadal..? - but have you considered Nadal’s dominance on clay??”
“No, I just mean Federer is my favourite - I really like his style.”
And this is a perfectly reasonable response. Equally:
“Do you mean Federer is objectively better than Nadal..? - but have you considered Nadal’s dominance on clay??”
“Yes, I think he is objectively better… Because I don’t think Nadal’s dominance on clay outweighs Federer’s overall technique and ability. ”
And this too is perfectly reasonable. Notice how because I am declaring an opinion of fact in this second case, the matter is open to debate. This is partly because the truth or falsity of such statements are determined by facts about the players themselves (such as their technique, ability, or even their ‘dominance on clay’), rather than my own taste. I also might be wrong about my opinion of fact - and with enough counter-argument I might be convinced as such. By contrast, you can’t really be wrong about your own preference of taste in the same way.2
But we seem to think there are limits to these statements - you can’t just declare any preference of taste, nor can you declare an opinion of fact about anything. For example, if a mother declares “I think my son is better than Nadal… de gustibus non est disputandum!”, her statement really ought to be dismissed on the grounds that she isn’t truly judging them by anything to do with their tennis playing. And conversely, there are limits to what we can declare as opinions of fact. For example, if I declared “I think strawberry is objectively the best ice cream flavour” then I might be dismissed on the grounds that there is no such thing as an objectively superior ice cream flavour.
And we can debate over what these limits are, and what can and cannot be objectively/subjectively compared. For example, this is an prevalent discussion within aesthetics: Can artworks be objectively compared? I wrote a paper on this question earlier this year, focussing on such a debate between Helen Knight and Margaret Macdonald in 1936 and 19493, and have since presented it twice. Both of these talks have lead to very interesting and keen discussion afterwards; often about the nature of comparing artworks and ontowards about the logic of comparing any two things. As far as I am aware, almost all previous responses to this question have approached it by asking whether artworks in general can be objectively judged - and then drawn their response from there (please do tell me if there are any philosophers who have done otherwise, that I am unaware of). What I am proposing, and will develop across the following articles, is a response to this question that begins with a comprehensive account of comparisons themselves, and then assesses whether artworks are comparible according to this account.
The question I’ll have to answer first, then, is ‘What determines whether two things are objectively comparable?’. Why exactly can I compare two tennis players, but not two ice cream flavours? It has been hard to find existing complete answers to this question (if you know of any, do let me know), but what makes this topic so exciting to discuss - among friends, after my conferences, and I expect now online - is that almost everyone intuitively has their own responses to these questions. But what we are lacking, I think, is a comprehensive and structured way of approaching them.
This is perhaps not the best term I could use, since it might be confusing (e.g. we often signal declarations of preference of taste with phrases like “This is just my opinion”. Any ideas on a better phrasing are very welcome.
“In the same way” because it is plausible to be wrong about your own preference of taste. You could, of course, lie about your taste (and thus it is not true that whatever preference of taste you might utter is automatically true). You might also be unaware of all of your own desires, so while you may think that the best ice cream flavour is strawberry - you may be wrong simply because you have never tasted rum & raisin… This is its own kettle of fish, which I’ll leave for now.
See Knight 1936, Macdonald 1949, and also Spinney 2024.
Knight, H. (1936). ‘The Use of “Good” in Æsthetic Judgements’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 36: 207–22.
Macdonald, M. (1949) ‘What are the Distinctive Features of Arguments Used in Criticism of the Arts’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 23: 183–94.
Spinney, O. T. (2024). ‘Helen Knight and Margaret Macdonald on the meaning of ‘good.’’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 33(4): 911–929.